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ABSTRACT. The introduction of the euro gave a unique opportunity to
empirically disentangle two components of utility: intrinsic value, a ratio-
nal component central in economics, and the numerosity effect (going
by numbers while ignoring units), a descriptive and irrational component
central in prospect theory and underlying the money illusion. We mea-
sured relative risk aversion in Belgium before and after the introduction
of the euro, and could consider changes in intrinsic value while keep-
ing numbers constant, and changes in numbers while keeping intrinsic
value constant. Intrinsic value signiﬁcantly affected risk aversion, and the
numerosity effect did not. Our study is the ﬁrst to conﬁrm the classi-
cal hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion while avoiding irratio-
nal distortions due to the numerosity effect.
KEY WORDS: utility, currency change, prospect theory, psychology of
money, money illusion, relative risk aversion
1. INTRODUCTION
The classical economic assumption of diminishing marginal
utility is based on a natural intuition: the ﬁrst dollar is
spent on the most useful commodity, the second on the
second-most useful commodity; and so on. Each new dollar
brings less extra utility than the one before. Under expected
utility, risk aversion results. Prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) makes different assumptions about marginal
utility, based on the psychological principle of diminishing
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sensitivity. People are more sensitive to changes near their
status quo than to changes remote from their status quo. For
gains, this principle reinforces the implications of the classical
economic assumption, with concave utility and a change from
$10 into $20 having more impact than a change from $110
into $120. For losses, however, the principle implies a pattern
opposite to the classical economic assumption, with convex
utility and a change from −$10 into −$20 having more, rather
than less, impact than a change from −$110 to −$120.
How can the classical economic predictions and those of
prospect theory be so diametrically opposed to each other for
losses? The explanation is that they concern different aspects
of utility. The economic prediction concerns the intrinsic
goodness of money, reﬂecting ways in which money improves
the purchasing power and well-being of a consumer, and
this is what “wealth” is commonly taken to designate. Pros-
pect theory focuses on the general perception of quantity, as
observed in many domains in psychology. The former aspect
depends on ﬁnal wealth and is rational, the latter depends on
changes with respect to a perceived reference point and can
lead to irrationalities. Kahneman’s (2003) discussion of the
value function of money in prospect theory, indeed, concerned
general psychological perceptions, and not the intrinsic value
that is typical of money and that distinguishes money from
other quantities (pp. 703–705, and p. 710 2nd para of 2nd
column). Thaler (1985) also explained prospect theory’s value
function through numerical perception: “. . . captures the basic
psychophysics of quantity. The difference between $10 and
$20 seems greater than the difference between $110 and $120,
irrespective of the signs of the amounts in question” (p. 201).
A special effect, contributing to diminishing sensitivity when
quantitative stimuli are described numerically, is the numer-
osity effect: People focus on the numbers indicating a scale’s
value without concern for the unit or physical meaning of the
scale.
If the perception of money were entirely driven by the
numerosity effect, then it would be plausible that the utility
of losses would mirror the utility of gains. More generally,
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decisions for losses would closely mirror decisions for gains,
and, for instance, an equivalence between a sure gain $X and
a lottery L over gains would lead to the mirrored equivalence
between the sure loss −$X and the lottery −L over losses.
This assumption, the reﬂection effect, was indeed put forward
in original prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
It is plausible, however, that both intrinsic value and the
numerosity effect will affect decisions. These two components
will jointly determine the utility of money as we observe
it (Fennema and van Assen, 1999; Kahneman et al., 1997;
Myagkov and Plott, 1997; Shaﬁr et al., 1997). The numerosity
effect is determined by the nominal value of money, irrespec-
tive of what the actual value of money is, and for the intrin-
sic-value component it is the other way around. Because for
gains both components enhance concavity, concavity will be
too pronounced there from a normative perspective (Rabin,
2000). For losses the two components have opposite effects,
so that they are more clearly distinct. Instead of the strict
reﬂection hypothesis of prospect theory of 1979, the following
moderate version is plausible.
PARTIAL REFLECTION. For gains, utility is concave. For
losses, utility is mildly convex and closer to linear than for
gains.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992, Condition V2) stated a sim-
ilar hypothesis in terms of intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution. A literature search conﬁrmed partial reﬂection.1 For
losses near ruin, the intrinsic value of money becomes so
salient that it will dominate psychological perception, yield-
ing concave utility again (Kahneman, 2003, p. 705). Partial
reﬂection clearly demonstrates that both intrinsic value and
the numerosity effect play a role. This joint role of both com-
ponents will be investigated in this paper.
Whereas the two components are most clearly distinguished
when comparing gains to losses, where they have diametrically
opposite effects, losses are difﬁcult to implement in an exper-
iment. We will, therefore, disentangle the two components in
another domain, with only gains, in our experiment. Further
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explanation is given later. The separation of intrinsic value
and the numerosity effect is important (also for gains) because
the former is normatively relevant, but the latter and, in gen-
eral, reference-dependence, do not seem to be. We would not
want a policy recommendation to depend on whether money
is expressed as $x or as 100x cents. When prescribing deci-
sions or making policy recommendations we would like to
ﬁlter out the numerosity effect (Bleichrodt et al., 2005; Fen-
nema and van Assen, 1998; Myagkov and Plott, 1997). When
analyzing observations and communicating risks we should,
however, reckon with the numerosity effect as an existing
empirical phenomenon. The separation of intrinsic value and
the numerosity effect is descriptively important for repeated
decisions and learning, and for market situations, situations in
which rationality will be enhanced (Myagkov and Plott, 1997,
Result 4 and Conjectures 2 and 3; Plott 1986). To predict
behavior in such situations, it is useful to know which aspects
of utility, measured through the usual experiments such as
reported in this paper, can be expected to be maintained and
which will be reduced.
The numerosity effect has been studied in psychology
(Galanter and Pliner, 1974; Atkinson et al., 1988, Part I of
Vol. I; Pelham et al., 1994; Peters et al., 2006) and in medicine
(Zorzi et al., 2002). It played a role in many economic studies,
concerning payments in foreign or artiﬁcial currencies (Barron
and Erev, 2003; Forsythe et al., 1982; Harris, 1991; Harrison,
1994; Jonas et al., 2002; Plott and Sunder, 1982; Soman et al.,
2002, who have many more references), payments in probabil-
ities instead of money (Allen, 1987; Anscombe and Aumann,
1963; Berg et al., 1986; Davis and Holt, 1993; Loomes, 1998;
Roth and Malouf, 1979; Selten et al., 1999), the money illu-
sion (Fehr and Tyran, 2001; Leontief, 1936; Shaﬁr et al.,
1997) and its role in inﬂation, and other topics (Benartzi and
Thaler, 1995, p. 82; Huber et al., 2001). Edwards (1954, p.
399) suggested not using monetary outcomes, but qualitative
outcomes, so as to avoid the numerosity effect.
A clear empirical separation of the numerosity effect
and intrinsic value is usually hard to obtain, because both






















Increasing nominal value by a 
factor 40 automatically implies 
increasing wealth by a factor 
40, and vice versa.
Figure 1. Usual Inseparability of value- and numerosity effects.
components covary with money (Figure 1). Some insights can
be obtained if we compare different currencies of different
countries. There are, however, difﬁculties with such compari-
sons. In between-subject designs they concern different people
in different situations, and cultural and economic differences
intervene. In within-subject designs, conversion problems will
arise. Most subjects will then mentally convert foreign cur-
rencies into their own currency. Hence, if no numerosity
effect is found, it may be due to such conversions. If a
numerosity effect is found, it may be due to confusions
regarding the unfamiliar currencies (Ragubir and Srivastava
2002). Hence, it is always difﬁcult to draw clear conclusions.
Some authors used payments in artiﬁcial units. Then again
problems can arise with subjects mentally converting to their
own currency or with subjects being confused about the unfa-
miliar unit. Such problems are also likely to arise if we
compare payments in cents to payments in dollars or euros.
Comparisons across time, with the value of money changed
by inﬂation, can also give insights, and this is the classical
domain of the money illusion, but these comparisons are dis-
torted by other changes over time.
Changes of currency in a country provide a good, though
rare, opportunity to empirically separate the two components
in controled experiments while minimizing the distortions just
mentioned. Such an opportunity arose in Europe in 2002
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through the introduction of the euro. We used this opportu-
nity for an experimental study carried out in Belgium, with
measurements in Belgium Francs in December 2001 and in
euros in May 2002. Although mental conversions and con-
fusions may still have occurred in our experiment, they are
less likely in our design than in any other of the designs used
before in the literature (see above). In the treatment in May
2002, the subjects had 4months time to get used to the new
unit of payment in their everyday life, something that will be
impossible to implement in controled experiments otherwise.
From the 11 European countries that introduced the euro
in 2002 we chose Belgium for the following reasons. First,
Belgium’s conversion rate, BF40 for C1, is round, so that
round numbers before the conversion can correspond to
round numbers after. Sonnemans (2006) found that differ-
ences in rounding affected investment behavior in the Nether-
lands. We wanted to avoid such distorting effects on behavior.
Second and most important, the conversion rate in Belgium
is considerable, unlike the reasonably round conversion rate of
1.96 in Germany for instance, so that there is room for con-
siderable numerosity effects (Marques, 1999). Third, the other
European countries with round and considerable conversion
rates, Portugal and Italy, are farther remote from our own
location than Belgium.
By relating amounts BFx to amounts Cx, for various x,
we could observe the effects of intrinsic value while keeping
the numerosity effect constant. Similarly, by relating amounts
BFx to amounts Cx/40, we could observe the numerosity
effect while keeping intrinsic value constant. We investigated
the separation for gambles with positive prizes because for
these gambles real incentives are easier to implement. In our
design we can separate intrinsic utility and the numerosity
effect also if they go in the same direction, so that there is
no need to resort to losses. We therefore tested the separation
of intrinsic value and the numerosity effect through increas-
ing relative risk aversion (RRA) rather than through (partial)
reﬂection. Further details of the plan of our study are dis-
cussed in Section 3.
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The currency change generated many changes in the attitudes
of people, and it may be conjectured that differences between our
treatments are not due to numerosity effects or intrinsic value
as we conjecture, but to such other changes. To investigate this
possibility, we considered many studies into the psychology of
money and of currency changes. Currency changes generate lin-
guistic changes and, obviously, changes of coins and notes. The
numerosity effect does not seem to be systematically affected by
the former (Brysbaert et al., 1998) nor by the latter (Foltz et al.,
1984; Noe¨l and Serron, 1997). Other psychological effects may
be generated by positive or negative attitudes towards, for exam-
ple: (a) loss of the national identity; (b) a currency change and
the corresponding arithmetic requirements; (c) a domestic versus
a joint currency; (d) fear for nickle in the 1- and 2-euro coins.2
Phenomena of these kinds clearly affect absolute levels of per-
ceived utility, but have no clear effect on the curvature of utility as
relevant to RRA.We, therefore, took RRA as the dependent var-
iable in our experiment, and nominal value and intrinsic value as
independent variables. The corresponding index -U′′(x)/xU′(x) of
RRA is, indeed, the most commonly used index to describe cur-
vature of utility (“risk aversion”). Because this index is distorted
by empirical violations of expected utility, we will use a simpler
and theory-free index in our experiment, explained latter.
The classical economic assumption is that RRA is increas-
ing (Arrow, 1971 p. 97; Jevons, 1889 pp. 172–173), and many
empirical studies have conﬁrmed this.3 In particular, Holt and
Laury (2002) conﬁrmed the assumption for high real incen-
tives. The effect is commonly ascribed to intrinsic value, i.e.
to increases in wealth. The numerosity effect, through the
perception of higher numbers, also underlies it. The latter
appears for instance from the ratio-difference principle, where
people’s processing of numbers consists of a mix of ratios and
differences in situations where only one of these is appropri-
ate (Baron, 1997; Darke and Freedman, 1993; Fantino and
Goldshmidt, 2000; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Kirkpatrick
and Epstein, 1992; Peters et al., 2006; Quattrone and Tver-
sky, 1998, p. 727; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Soman et al.,
2002; Thaler, 1980).
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We measured the RRA of 88 subjects in December 2001,
shortly before the introduction of the euro, and did the same
for 93 subjects in May 2002, when people had started to get
accustomed to the euro. In this manner, we could distinguish
between changes in risk attitude and concave utility that were
generated by intrinsic value and changes generated by the
numerosity effect. Our hypothesis was that increases in numer-
ical perception and in intrinsic value both amplify RRA, and
we wanted to investigate which of these effects was larger.
2. THE EXPERIMENT
2.1. Procedure
The treatments with BF payments were carried out on two
different days in December 2001, just before the introduction
of the euro. The treatments with C payments were carried out
on two different days in May 2002, 4 months after the intro-
duction of the euro. The design was between-subjects.
Two experimenters asked students in the meeting area of
the University of Diepenbeek in Belgium whether they were
willing to participate in a 10 minutes experiment. If students
agreed to participate, they received a booklet with one page of
instructions, seven pages with one choice task on each page,
and a ﬁnal page asking for demographics and giving informa-
tion on how to contact us. Participants were asked to work
quietly and individually. The stimuli and the procedure were
tested in a pilot study of n=45 subjects.
2.2. Stimuli
Each subject made seven choices between a lottery and a sure
amount of money, such as between
• A lottery yielding BF600 with probability 15/20 and
nothing otherwise,
or
• A sure amount of BF400.
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Figure 2 depicts, in reduced form, examples of the choice
tasks presented to the participants for each of the four treat-
ments. The basic treatment was with low amounts of Belgium
francs (LBF), as in Fig. 2a. The second treatment, in Fig. 2b,
will be discussed later. Figure 2c depicts the third treatment
(LC), with all amounts of Belgium francs in Fig. 2a replaced
by euro-amounts of equal intrinsic value. It means that all
numbers of Fig. 2a were divided by 40. Figure 2d depicts the
fourth treatment (H C), with all amounts of Belgium francs
in Fig. 2a replaced by the same numbers of euros, yielding
40 times higher intrinsic values. The second treatment (HBF),
in Fig. 2b, replaced all C-amounts of the fourth treatment by
BF-amounts of the same value, resulting in quantities of Bel-
gium francs 40 times bigger than in the basic LBF treatment.
Table I in the results section gives a complete description of
the probabilities and outcomes in the seven choice questions.
The ﬁrst two tasks served as learning exercises, to test for
extreme risk attitudes and to discourage choices for certainty
or for risk without inspecting the probabilities and outcomes.
The order of the ﬁve experimental tasks was counterbalanced.
The questionnaire was in Flamish.4 An English translation is
available in the Appendix.
2.3. Implementation of real incentives
Paying each participant according to one or more of their
choices would have been too expensive, given the high stakes
that could not be avoided in the high-payment treatment.
We, therefore, developed a random-lottery incentive system
depicted in Figure 3 (discussed in Section 5). The low-treatment
subjects had a 1/2 chance, and the high-treatment subjects a
1/20 chance, to play one of their choices for real.
After the subjects had ﬁlled out the seven pages with
choices, the LBF and LC groups guessed odd or even, and the
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Figure 2. Examples of our stimuli.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. The random-lottery incentive system for motivating the participants.
HBF and HC groups guessed one number between 1 and 20.
They next threw a 20-sided die. If the resulting number did
not agree with the prediction, the game was over and no
money was paid. In the other case, the subjects drew one card
at random from seven numbered cards. This number deter-
mined which of their seven choices made during the experi-
ment was played out for real. If they had chosen the risky
option in the choice selected, the probabilities were again gen-
erated by the subjects throwing a 20-sided die, where the num-
bers yielding the prize also had been chosen by the subjects
before throwing the die.
2.4. Subjects
N =181 subjects participated in the four treatments, n = 43 in
LBF, n=45 in HBF, n=48 in LC, and n=45 in HC. All partic-
ipants were students from various departments of the Univer-
sity of Diepenbeek. As many were male as female, and they
were of age between 17 and 24. Except 3, all were Flamish.
Subjects were not permitted to participate more than once.
2.5. Analysis
As degree of RRA of each subject we took the number
of safe choices excluding the two learning tasks. The four
different treatments were compared through independent-sam-
ples t-tests and through 2 by 2 analysis of variance with num-
ber of safe choices as dependent variable and intrinsic value
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(high-low payment) and nominal value (euro-BF) as indepen-
dent factors.
3. DISCUSSION OF THE PLAN OF OUR DESIGN
Figure 4 illustrates our design.
We compared the RRA in the four treatments. Diago-
nal comparisons constitute direct tests of RRA, and have
been frequently conducted in the literature. Constant RRA
means that risk attitude remains the same if all outcomes
are multiplied by a common positive factor. It implies no
changes along the diagonals in Figure 4. The common ﬁnd-
ing is increasing RRA, with more safe choices at the top of
the diagonal arrows than at their bottom. Our hypothesis is
that both horizontal and vertical moves in the direction of
the arrows amplify RRA. In classical economic texts, where
horizontal moves were considered irrelevant, it was common
to explain the observed increases in RRA through vertical
moves. Horizontal increases of RRA are supported by the
ratio-difference principle, referenced above.
Horizontal comparisons between different nominal values
while keeping the intrinsic values constant, and vertical com-
parisons between different intrinsic values while keeping the
































Figure 4. Plan of our design.
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numbers constant, usually cannot be observed. Because of the
introduction of the euro, we could make such observations.
4. RESULTS
Table I gives descriptive statistics. Questions 4 and 5 compare
a lottery to its expected value and, hence, provide direct tests
of risk aversion. Question 4 reveals signiﬁcant risk aversion
(t180 =−9.02, p<0.001; also p<0.01 for each of the four treat-
ments). Question 5 does not yield signiﬁcant deviation from
risk neutrality (only for the HBF treatement there is signiﬁ-
cant risk aversion, t43 = 4.98, p<0.001). We did not ﬁnd gen-
der effects in risk aversion (t177 = 0.162, p=0.872).
Figure 5 depicts the results of t-tests, with the learning
questions (choice # 1 and 2 in Table I) excluded. Including
them would not change any of the conclusions. All reported
signiﬁcance probabilities are one-tailed. The intrinsic-value
effect is in the predicted direction and is signiﬁcant. The num-
erosity effects are not signiﬁcant, with the strongest effect
even marginally signiﬁcant in the opposite direction.
Analysis of variance gave the same conclusions, with a












t88 = 0.79, p = 0.22






















































Figure 5. Results of t-tests.
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15.04, p < .001), a nonsigniﬁcant effect of nominal value
(F(1,180) = .23, p= .63), and a nonsigniﬁcant interaction
(F(1,180) = 2.28, p= .13). The absence of numerosity effects
suggests that there was no difference in RRA between BF
outcomes and C outcomes.
5. DISCUSSION
We discuss a number of limitations to our study. First, we
would have preferred a within-subjects design, but this was
not possible due to practical limitations.
Second, the procedure for implementing real incentives could
not be entirely identical for the two treatments. The average
gain over the seven choice tasks was about C5 (BF200) for the
low-stimuli treatments and C200 euro (BF8000) for the high-
stimuli treatments. Such large differences in payment between
treatments could, obviously, not be avoided in view of the con-
version factor of 40. Because of budgetary considerations, we
could not pay all amounts for real in the high-payment treat-
ments. We, therefore, introduced the 1/20 chance of playing one
choice for real in the high-payment treatments. The resulting
expected gain of C10 per participant for 10min time (with no
waiting or traveling time and no transaction costs because the
selection and payment were on the spot) is still very favorable.
For example, in Holt and Laury (2002) the majority of subjects
(their “20x real treatment”) earned an average of $68 while the
experiment lasted an hour on average. Hence, the subjects in
our high-payment treatment were among the best-paid per time
unit in the literature.
In order to have the procedures for the low- and high-pay-
ment treatments as similar as possible, we introduced a 1/2
chance to play one choice for real in the low-payment treat-
ments. It could not be 1/20 because then the payments would
be too low and subjects would not be sufﬁciently motivated
(Smith 1982, “payoff dominance”). For the low-payment treat-
ment, the expected gain was C2.5.
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The random-lottery incentive system, where not all choices
are paid so as to avoid income effects and house money
effects, but at most one choice is paid, has become the
almost exclusively used incentive system for individual choice
in experimental economics (Holt, 1986; Holt and Laury, 2002;
Starmer and Sugden, 1991). We used a form where not for
each participant one choice is played for real, but only for
some randomly selected participants. This form was also used
by Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002). Two studies exam-
ined whether there was a difference between this form and the
original form where each participant is paid, and did not ﬁnd
a difference (Armantier 2006, p. 406; Harrison et al., 2006,
footnote 16).
A third problem concerns the timing of the experiment.
It is, in general, desirable to observe different treatments as
much as possible in similar situations. No signiﬁcant historical
changes should take place between the measurements, inﬂa-
tion should be as small as possible, and so on. For these rea-
sons it was desirable to have our measurements before and
after the introduction of the euro as close to each other as
possible. It was also desirable, however, that subjects were
maximally familiar with the unit of payment used, and con-
sidered it as “their” currency. We wanted to minimize subjects
mentally converting euros into francs (or vice versa) during
the experiment (Juliusson et al., 2006). For this reason, it was
desirable to perform our measurement of the euro treatments
long after the introduction in January 2002. The actual timing
of our experiment was a compromise between the two, con-
ﬂicting, desiderata.
Fortunately for our experiment, no major historical changes
took place between December 2001 and May 2002. Only
usual random factors due to differences such as winter ver-
sus spring, middle of the academic year versus end thereof,
and a 5-months increase in age, remained. Four months is
obviously not enough to get completely used to a new cur-
rency and to forget about the old one. Our population, young
academic adults, can be expected to be among the fastest to
get adapted though. Indeed, the percentage of support for
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the euro was higher among students (78% while grouped with
self-employed people) than among other groups (European
Commission, 2002, p. 76; Mussweiler and Englich, 2003). In
April 2002, 80% of the Belgians indicated that they felt com-
fortable using the euro (European Commission, 2002, p. 79).
We were lucky that in this, and several other, respects Belgium
was among the most supportive countries for the euro. This
was conﬁrmed in EOS Gallup Europe (2002). To the extent
that subjects converted euros back into francs before deciding,
our study loses statistical power but not validity. Note that
not only did we accept the null hypothesis of no numerosi-
ty effect, but even we came close to marginally rejecting this
hypothesis in the direction opposite to the alternative hypoth-
esis.
We used the number of safe choices as an index of RRA.
The most commonly used index in the literature, through
−U ′′(x)/xU ′(x) with U utility and x the outcome, assumes
expected utility. There are, however, many empirical problems
with expected utility (Starmer, 2000), which is why we pre-
ferred not to use the above index. Descriptively better theo-
ries such as prospect theory are more complex to implement.
Because the index we used sufﬁces to answer our research
questions, is easy to understand, and does not require com-
mitment to a theory, we decided to use it in our analysis.
Relative to the parameters estimated by Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992), our participants usually stayed closer to expected
value maximization.
6. CONCLUSION
The observed utility functions for money consist of a norma-
tively relevant component based on intrinsic value, and the
numerosity effect, a normatively irrelevant component reﬂect-
ing the general perception of numbers. In general, measure-
ments of utility cannot separate these two components. A
change of currency in a country gives an opportunity to
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separate the two components after all, while avoiding a num-
ber of biases.
We carried out an empirical study in Belgium at the intro-
duction of the euro in 2001, measuring the relative risk aver-
sion of subjects. Because we were in the unique situation of
having subjects get used to a different unit of payment for
4months, and we considered the country in Europe, and the
subpopulation of that country, that best accepted the euro,
our design was optimal as regards avoiding mental conver-
sions of currencies or confusions. It, accordingly, seems to be
optimal for verifying the common economic hypothesis that
relative risk aversion increases with wealth, and not just with
perceived numbers.
Changes of nominal value did not have signiﬁcant effects,
but changes of intrinsic value did. This ﬁnding is positive for
the economic, normatively oriented view on utility. We are the
ﬁrst to have demonstrated the classical economic hypothesis
of increasing RRA while avoiding the distortions due to the
numerosity effect.
APPENDIX: THE INSTRUCTIONS, TRANSLATED INTO
ENGLISH
For each of the four treatments, the instruction were more
or less the same, and only one sentence differed between the
low- and the high-stimuli treatments. The instructions for the
low-stimuli treatments are given hereafter, with the deviat-
ing sentence for the high-stimuli treatments given in square
brackets.
INVESTIGATION OF OPINIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN
PAYMENTS
In this investigation, we are interested in opinions of people
about uncertain payments. We will present seven choice sit-
uations to you. In each you can choose between the certain
receipt of an amount of money or the playing of a lottery.
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When playing the lottery you may win, with some probability,
an amount of money, and you gain nothing otherwise. You
can only gain money, and you will never lose money. There
are no right or wrong answers for these questions, and they
only concern your own preferences. Your preferences are what
we are interested in!
• On each of the following seven pages there is an amount
of money that you can gain with certainty and a lottery
for money. You are asked each time what you would pre-
fer most: receiving the sure amount of money or playing
the lottery. Cross out your preference each time.
It is next determined whether one of your choices will be
played for real. For this purpose, you will be asked to guess
whether an odd or even number shows up when you throw
a 20-sided die. [For this purpose, you will be asked to guess
which number will come up when you throw a 20-sided die.]
• If you guessed wrong, the experiment is over and you,
unfortunately, did not gain anything. If you guessed right,
then one of the choices that you crossed out will be
played for real.
• You then draw one of seven numbered cards to determine
from which page the choice you made will be played out
for real.
• From the selected page you receive the sure amount of
money if that is what you crossed out, and we play the
lottery if that is what you crossed out.
As said before, there are no right or wrong answers, and
we are interested in your own preferences. It is also favorable
for yourself to cross out your preferred option on each page.
After all, if that page is selected, then we really carry out what
you crossed out there.
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NOTES
1. More concave utility for gains than convex utility for losses was found
by Abdellaoui (2000, p. 1506), Abdellaoui et al. (2005a), Abdellaoui et
al. (2005b), Abdellaoui et al. (2007a), Currim and Sarin (1989, p. 30),
Fennema and van Assen (1999), Galanter and Pliner (1974, power 0.45
for gains, 0.39 for losses), Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 279), Laury
and Holt (2007), List (2006), and Loomes (1998). Consistent with this,
there was more pronounced risk aversion for gains than risk seeking
for losses in Battalio et al. (1990, p. 32), Battalio et al. (1985), Bude-
scu and Weiss (1987, p. 193), Camerer (1989, Table 5), Dickhaut et
al. (2003), Gonza´lez-Vallejo et al. (2003, Fig. 1 and Table 2), Harless
and Camerer (1994 p. 1281), Hershey and Schoemaker (1980, Table 3
and p. 409), Ku¨hberger et al. (1999, pp. 216–217), Lopes and Oden
(1999), Pennings and Smidts (2003), Schneider and Lopes (1986), Smith
et al. (2002, Figure 2), Wakker et al. (2006), Weber and Bottom (1989,
Exhibit 8). Unclear or balanced ﬁndings were obtained by Abdellaoui
et al. (2007b), Booij and van de Kuilen (2006), Hogarth and Einhorn
(1990, Tables 2 and 4), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Schunk and
Betsch (2006), and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). An opposite ﬁnding,
with more convexity for losses than concavity for gains, was obtained by
Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979, p. 511). In line with this, Cohen, Jaf-
fray, and Said (1987, Table 3) and Levin and Hart (2003) found more
risk seeking for losses than risk aversion for gains.
2. Bornemann (1976); Bruner and Goodman (1947); Furnham and
Argyle (1998); Gamble et al. (2002); Jonas et al. (2002); Marques (1999);
Meier-Pesti and Kirchler (2003); Mu¨ller-Peters (1998); Mussweiler and
Englich (2003); Nestle et al. (2002); Pepermans et al. (1998); Stenkula
(2004).
3. Baron (1997); Binswanger (1981); Harrison et al. (2005); Kachelmeier
and Shehata (1992); Rapoport (1984). Mixed results are in Barsky et al.
(1997). The opposite, decreasing RRA, has also been found, especially
near ruin, by Cohn et al. (1975), Friend and Blume (1975), and Ogaki
and Zhang (2001).
4. Thanks to Myriam Welkenhuysen for correcting the Flamish language.
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